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FRAUDULENT CREDENTIALS: FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

A REPORT

BY THE

CHAIRMAN

OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

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FOREWORD

The Subcommittee on Health and Long-Term Care has a long-standing interest in frauds against the elderly. One of the most heinous types is the practice of a profession using fraudulent credentials. Sometimes the offense is practically harmless—a person will purchase a bogus doctoral degree just for the prestige it affords. In an alarming number of cases, however, involving such serious pursuits as the health sciences, aerospace engineering and national security, the health and even the lives of Americans can be placed in jeopardy.

During the course of our investigation into fraudulent credentials, the Subcommittee learned that a single salesman of these items, Mr. Anthony Geruntino, awarded approximately 3,000 bachelor, master and doctoral degrees from nonexistent universities he created. A list supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed that among his "graduates" were 400 individuals working in the most sensitive positions in Federal, State and local government offices—persons who may have been hired on the basis of those bogus credentials.

Unfortunately, Geruntino's operation appears to be simply the tip of the iceberg. Testimony heard before our Subcommittee suggests that some 150 phony universities may be operating in the United States at this moment, granting in their lifetime time about 3,000 individual degrees in disciplines ranging from architecture to zoology. Many of these graduates will affect the lives of Americans in very significant ways—with life-threatening consequences a very real possibility.

With the release of this report, I am calling upon the Federal agencies to investigate the qualifications of employees whose backgrounds are in question by the Subcommittee. I am asking that they provide the Subcommittee with a statement of the actions they have taken to verify the authenticity of those employees' academic credentials. I am also requesting that they take appropriate action where necessary to ensure that these sensitive posts are occupied by competent and genuinely qualified individuals.

This is a serious matter for our elderly citizens, particularly in the area of medical care, but also for all Americans. Unless appropriate State and Federal remedies are pursued and enacted, the problem of phony credentials will continue and escalate. I invite you to read the report which follows and I sincerely hope that reform measures in this area will be immediately forthcoming.

CLAUDE PEPPER,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Health and Long-Term Care.

FRAUDULENT CREDENTIALS: FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

The House Select Committee on Aging is a Committee of the Congress charged with research into the problems of America's elderly and oversight of existing programs benefitting that group. One of the most frequently examined problems is fraud against the elderly. Over the past seven years, the Committee and its Subcommittees have convened dozens of hearings on this issue in Washington, D.C. and around the country, on topics ranging from quackery to pension fraud to insurance scams.

One of the most disturbing discoveries has been the extent to which older Americans are the target of medical fraud schemes. A May 1984 hearing by the Subcommittee on Health and Long-Term Care revealed that, although older Americans comprised about 11% of the nation's population, they accounted for about 60% of the victims of health fraud, which costs the nation about $10 billion annually. Spurred by this finding, the Subcommittee chose to take a closer look at what it considered the most grievous form of health fraud encountered by Americans—the provision of medical care by unlicensed and unqualified people posing as doctors.

FRAUDULENT CREDENTIALS: THE MEDICAL SECTOR

On December 7, 1984, the Subcommittee held a hearing entitled "Fraudulent Medical Degrees." We found that for many years the United States has allowed U.S. citizens to practice with "doctored" credentials, primarily from a small number of foreign medical schools, and to receive medical licenses without displaying the same level of medical knowledge and clinical competence as graduates of U.S. medical schools. We also discovered that most State and Federal agencies had relatively lax systems for checking the credentials of graduates of unaccredited medical schools.

The Subcommittee found that upward of 10,000 or one in every 50 doctors now in hospitals and private practice have obtained fraudulent or highly questionable medical credentials. In other words, Americans were then and continue to be receiving medical treatment from doctors who either stole or paid for their degrees, or stole or paid for a copy of an exam which had to be passed before they could practice medicine. Testimony at the hearing confirmed that in July 1983, 3,000 to 4,000 of the 17,000 students who took the test for foreign medical graduates saw the answers in advance. To gain a better understanding of how one goes about obtaining phony medical credentials, the Subcommittee heard testimony from Pedro de Mesones, who served a three-year sentence in Federal prison for providing fraudulent medical credentials to 165 people from October 1980 to August 1983. Thirteen of those students obtained their medical licenses and six were found to be working in medical resi-

dency programs. De Mesones made $1.5 million before he was caught by the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

We also heard from a representative of a patient cared for by a phony doctor. This doctor assumed the medical credentials of another doctor and rose to the rank of chief medical officer in the military. He was later employed by numerous reputable medical hospitals and the National Institute on Aging. His career came to an end in 1983 when his incompetency resulted in the permanent brain damage of one of his patients.

In connection with this hearing, the Subcommittee surveyed all the State medical examiners in an effort to determine what the States' experiences had been with regard to phony doctors. Virtually every State acknowledged the seriousness of this problem. Half the States indicated they had had experience with phony doctors practicing within their boundaries. Fifteen States had already initiated investigations.

The obvious question stimulated by the hearing was, if the quality of education in these few foreign medical schools is so bad and the requirements of training, testing and financial assistance can be circumvented, why do they continue to operate? The answer is simply a matter of supply and demand. Only about one half of applicants to American medical schools are accepted. That is, we don't have enough room in our medical colleges in the country to accommodate the number of interested students. With only about half of the applicants accepted, we find ourselves with about 15,000 more Americans who want to become doctors than can find a place in American medical schools. For some foreign medical schools, the motivation to set up medical schools is equally clear—it is good business. For example, Americans spent between $40 million and $50 million in 1983 in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, on tuition and living expenses.

Following the hearing, the Subcommittee on Health and Long-Term Care called upon the General Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct a study to determine, among other things, what the role of the Federal government might be in curbing the proliferation of ill-trained or fraudulent medical practitioners. In October 1985, the GAO filed its report with the Subcommittee. In essence, it stated that the problem of inadequate training of Americans studying medicine abroad is growing in magnitude and that government action is needed to deal with it. Further, the GAO recommended that a more coordinated approach be taken to address the wide variety of foreign medical graduate issues and suggested that legislation be considered which would authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services to approve accreditation standards of foreign medical schools accrediting bodies. Such legislation has been introduced by Congressman Pepper and is currently pending consideration in the Congress.

Fraudulent Credentials: Across Disciplines

Following the December 1984 hearing, "Fraudulent Medical Degrees," the Subcommittee was inundated with testimonials of abuse at the hands of unlicensed, ill-credentialed practitioners ranging from those claiming expertise in health care to literally every

imaginable profession which would touch upon the needs sought to be fulfilled by an aging consumer. The Subcommittee on Health and Long-Term Care asked the Aging Committee's Subcommittee on Housing and Consumer Interests to join a year-long investigation into fraudulent credentials in an attempt to provide some definition of the extent and nature of fraudulent credentialing in the U.S. today and to determine the degree to which older Americans fall prey to the practices of ill-equipped fraudulent professionals in today's marketplace. The result was a followup hearing, "Fraudulent Credentials," on December 11, 1985. The Subcommittees' report on the topic was released that same day.

The Subcommittees found that fraudulent credentials are a large and growing national problem which today may touch the lives of nearly every American. It is a large problem which spans the full range of occupations, from architecture to zoology, in every region of this nation. The Subcommittees found that the fraudulent credential problem is fueled by the profitability and ease of peddling bogus credentials, widening gaps between the number of college graduates and the number of jobs available to them, the unlikelihood of "phonies" being detected and punished, and an increasingly credential-conscious American society which bestows greater esteem and higher salaries upon those holding advanced degrees and other credentials.

Highlights of the Subcommittees' report released in conjunction with the hearing included the following:

—*The Subcommittees found that the role education plays in the United States in term of supply and demand has influenced the proliferation of fraudulent credentials in certain occupational areas.* Whereas only 7.7% of all Americans in 1960 has completed 4 or more years of college, by 1985 that number had more than tripled. At the same time, the number of desirable jobs has not kept pace with the increasing number of college-educated Americans. More graduates are competing for fewer jobs and this disparity in educated versus job opportunities is likely to continue. Advanced degrees garner higher salaries and this has stimulated an increase in the number of students pursuing such degrees. These trends fuel the growth of a growing illegal new industry which preys upon the fears current job seekers have in their search for meaningful employment opportunities. More than ever, credentials are critical in the competition for job security.

—The Subcommittees found that an increasing number of Americans are turning to nontraditional methods to obtain college degrees—and that *today there may be upwards of 500,000 or one in 200 working Americans who have sought, obtained and in many instances are employed on the basis of some form of fraudulent credential.* Of this number, some may be used merely for vanity. In far too many instances, however, these credentials will be put to use in the workplace, where the consequences can range from negligible to life-threatening. In addition, *as many as 30 million or 1 in 3 currently employed Americans are hired with credentials which have been altered in some way.* This form of abuses runs the gamut from the simple manipulation of a resume to include on additional club

affiliation, to filling in the gaps of an employment history, to the more serious abuse of adding a nonexistent advanced degree.

—*The Subcommittees found that the methods for promoting phony credentials range from sophisticated "brokers" who for a fee will secure a desired credential from an existing educational institution and "diploma mill" degrees offered without requiring that learning or testing take place*—just that a check be received, to degrees or resumes embellished or manufactured solely through the ingenuity of the individual degree seeker acting on his or her own behalf. The Subcommittees found that it is not necessarily illegal for a mail order school to be established. It only becomes illegal when it can be proven that the school does not provide a learning experience nor the testing of competency, as the school suggests. It is also not necessarily illegal for an individual to purchase a bogus credential from a bogus institution. It becomes illegal, in the context of the report, when it is put to fraudulent use. This same standard must also be met by a prosecutor in convincing a court that the mail or wire fraud statutes (the primary statutes violated by those promoting and purchasing fraudulent credentials) have been violated. A profile of the credential abuser and victim emerges. The "abuser" is in most instances both the buyer and seller of the phony credential. The victim is society, employers, legitimate nontraditional schools, and legitimate colleges and universities.

—*The Subcommittees found it is relatively easy to procure a degree.* To determine the ease with which a degree could be purchased, the Subcommittees, in the name of C.D. Pepper, responded to an April 1985 magazine advertisement which suggested that a degree could be secured on the basis of life experience, and ended on December 4, 1985, when the Subcommittee received official notice, dated November 23, 1985, from a university in California, that its Chairman, Claude Pepper, had successfully completed the requirements for his Ph.D. in Psychology. In fact, the only requirements fulfilled by "C.D. Pepper" were the completion of four short book reports, on *Plain Speaking, The Power of Positive Thinking, Too Old, Too Sick, Too Bad,* and *Mental Health and the Elderly,* and the payment of over $1800.

—The Subcommittees found from data collected from 227 registrars of colleges and universities listed in *Barron's Guide to the Most Prestigious Colleges* that:

1. College and university registrars receive, on the average, about 500 requests for degree verification a year;

2. The majority of college and university registrars reported that false degree claims were an increasing problem spanning literally all occupations; and

3. College and university registrars were unanimous in their opinion that they were not in the appropriate position to act on questionable degrees, and that action should be taken by those State and Federal authorities in a position to do so.

—*The Subcommittees found that 150 to 500 fraudulent credential mills are currently in existence in the United States. On the av-*

erage, each credential mill may, in its lifetime, "award" about 3,000 bachelor to doctoral degrees—across a vast spectrum of occupations. The Subcommittees estimate that upwards of 500,000, or one in every 200 working Americans possess fraudulent credentials and many, as this report indicates, hold jobs on the basis of these fraudulent credentials. This total includes 10,000 doctors or one in every 50 physicians, practicing with falsified or questionable credentials. In addition, as many as 30 million or one in 3 currently employed Americans may have been hired with credentials which were altered or embellished. The Subcommittees found that phony degree seekers pay anywhere from $5 for a simple "outstanding service" citation to $28,000 for a medical degree complete with transcripts, diploma, employment references and verification services. The procurement of falsified or misstated credentials is increasing and is serious in nature. Victims of falsified credentials include: society at large; employers who rely on empty credentials; persons who become patients, clients and colleagues of such paper practitioners; and some legitimate, nontraditional "schools without walls," which are victimized by such exploitation.

—Regrettably, *the Subcommittees found that older Americans are the most common victims of the most dangerous fraudulent practitioner—the fraudulent medical practitioner—as seniors utilize health services 3 times more often than their younger counterparts and are hospitalized at 2 and one half times the rate of those under the age of 65.* Older Americans pay the lion's share of the public's portion of our nation's health care bill, and are more likely to line the pockets of phony doctors and other health practitioners than any other segment of the population. Lastly, the Subcommittee found that the facility with which phony degree-granting institutions can be established, coupled with the relative ease with which a fraudulent practitioner can avoid detection or circumvent disciplinary action, seriously impedes State and Federal efforts to curb the incidence of fraudulent credentials in the United States today.

—*The Subcommittees found that fraudulent credentials are primarily promoted and purchased through the use of the mails and the telephone.* Since fraudulent activities in this regard are violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes, the Subcommittees analyzed the activities of the agencies with primary enforcement authority over these two statutes: the U.S. Postal Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Both agencies are doing a commendable job of ferreting out such fraudulent credentialing but could be assisted in their activities with the enactment of the following legislative reforms:

1. The Congress should strengthen the Federal mail fraud statute by increasing penalties from fines of $1000 per violation and/or prison sentences of 5 years per violation to $10,000 and 10 years per violation;

2. The Congress should consider legislation creating a national computerized clearinghouse on fraudulent credentials in order to assist the States in their efforts to identify and discipline fraudulent practitioners who can currently circumvent

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with relative ease such disciplinary actions simply by moving from State to State;

3. The Congress should enact the recommendation of GAO relative to the courses of study offered in medical schools, to assure that all physicians practicing in the U.S., regardless of origin of education, meet acceptable standards of medical education; and

4. Each State should have and enforce at least minimum academic and financial requirements for all schools. Licenses should be issued to schools contingent upon initial and continued review by the States.

Fraudulent Credentials: Federal Employees

At their 1985 hearing, "Fraudulent Credentials," the Subcommittee heard testimony from Mr. Anthony James Geruntino, an inmate of the Federal Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana, who was convicted for having awarded approximately 3,000 diplomas from nonexistent universities which he operated out of post office boxes. Mr. Geruntino detailed for the Subcommittee's the methods he used to solicit interested graduates prior to selling a master's degree to an undercover FBI agent. The sale of that degree led to his conviction on charges of wire and mail fraud, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting in the operation of a diploma mill.

In the course of the Subcommittees' investigation into Mr. Geruntino's diploma mill, it was learned that an FBI review of Geruntino's files had yielded the names of some 200 Federal and 200 State government employees who had purchased fraudulent degrees. The FBI further informed the Subcommittee that all Inspectors General of Federal agencies within which Geruntino degree holders were employed had been so notified. To determine what action Inspectors General had taken on the FBI referrals, the Subcommittee on Health and Long-Term Care contacted each of these Federal agencies for appropriate response. To date, only one agency, the U.S. Postal Service, has taken any action against phony degree holders within the agency.

On February 26, 1986, the Subcommittee contacted by telephone a special agent with the FBI in Charlotte, North Carolina and requested a copy of the entire listing of "graduates" of Northwestern College of Allied Science, American Western University, and Southwestern University submitted as evidence during the trial of the universities' founder. The Subcommittee found that where information was available concerning the "graduate's" current place of employment, it was so noted on Geruntino's list next to the person's name and type of degree granted. Relevant portions of this court document are attached in Appendix A for further review.

A review of this document by the Subcommittee indicates that some individuals working in highly sensitive positions within the Federal government—positions with influence on the health and well-being of countless Americans—may be doing so on the basis of credentials purchased from phony universities, many of which have been determined by the FBI and the courts as existing only as post office boxes.

Notable among Geruntino's graduates are the following high-ranking officials:

—An engineer at Kennedy Space Center who sought and obtained a B.S. in Electrical Engineering;

—An employee with Westinghouse Nuclear International, which contracts with the Federal government to construct nuclear power plants, who sought and obtained a B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. in Civil Engineering;

—An employee with Post-Launch Operations, Kennedy Space Center, who sought and obtained an B.S. in Mechanical Engineering;

An employee with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army Pentagon, who sought and obtained a Ph.D. in History;

An employee with the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, who sought and received a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering;

An employee with NASA's Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, who sought and obtained a Ph.D. in Electrical aerospace Engineering;

An air traffic controller with the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Center received a B.A. in Aviation;

A chief deputy U.S. Marshal in California sought and obtained B.S. and B.A. degrees; and the list goes on and on.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has advised the Subcommittee on Health and Long-Term Care that about 200 Federal employees sought and obtained degrees from Geruntino's bogus universities alone. Testimony before the Subcommittee reveals that Geruntino's diploma mill is only one of about 150 such operations that will grant approximately 3,000 degrees in the course of the operation's lifetime. The Subcommittee has requested appropriate law enforcement agencies to submit to the Subcommittee complete listings of "graduates" of universities determined by the courts to be bogus.

Summary

It is incumbent upon the Federal agencies to investigate the qualifications of employees. It is imperative that they review the academic backgrounds of those whose qualifications have been called into question, as this report implies. The Subcommittee will transmit a copy of this report to the Inspector General of each agency in which an employee has been identified to be in possession of a degree obtained through a bogus university. It bears repeating that it is not illegal to purchase a bogus degree from a bogus institution. It only becomes illegal when such a degree is put to illegal use. It is to ascertain whether crimes of this nature have been committed that a swift and complete reply from appropriate Federal agencies will be sought by the Subcommittee.

In addition, the Subcommittee has taken the liberty of personally notifying all graduates listed in Appendix A as currently employed by the Federal government to respond to questions regarding their use of the "bogus" degree they purchased. Their replies will be made part of a future report summarizing the national response to this report.

Pending the forthcoming Federal agencies responses to the Subcommittee, and the responses of the agency employees, it should be obvious that legislation for reform is warranted. H.R. 4213, currently pending in the Congress, should be swiftly enacted. This measure amends Title 18 of the U.S. Code to increase the existing penalties for mail fraud from $1,000 to $10,000 and from 5 years to 10 years for each count of mail fraud. It also provides for criminal and civil forfeitures for such offenses. This would be an important step toward combatting the sale of fraudulent degrees, for which the mails are the major vehicle.

APPENDIX A

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Charlotte, NC, March 4, 1986.

Mr. LANNY MILLER,
Subcommittee on Health and Long-Term Care, Second and D Streets SW., Room 377, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. MILLER: This will acknowledge your February 26, 1986, telephone conversation with Special Agent Allen Ezell of the Charlotte Federal Bureau of Investigation Office.

Enclosed pursuant to your request is one copy of the entire listing of "graduates" of Northwestern College of Allied Science, American Western University, Southwestern University which documents were previously introduced as government exhibits in United States District Court, Western District of North Carolina, North Carolina, on May 22, 1985 at the time of the guilty plea by Anthony James Geruntino.

Please send Special Agent Ezell several copies of the committee's final report concerning fraudulent credentials.

Very truly yours,

ROBERT L. PENCE,
Special Agent in Charge.
(By:) RAYMOND J. BOWLEY,
Supervisory Special Agent.

Name		Degree received	Date received	Method of payment	Amount received	Employment and remarks	Box used
Meaney, George G., North Highlands, CA 95660.	4 8	BSBA	Aug. 17, 1981	Grad Aug Visa	390	Logistics/Management Specialist, 65–12, SM–ALC, McClellan AFB, CA 95652	51
Mitchell. III, Lyndon B., Waipauh, HI 96797..	5	BS&MBA	June 15, 1979, BBA Sept. 21, 1981.	MO	673.75	Maj. USAF, RB Lt. Col. USAF, Hickam AFB, Hawaii. Application dated 9–14–81 DOB 7–7–39.	
Morrow, Terry L., Schofield BLS, HI 96786...	4	AS AVI TECH	Aug. 17, 1981	MO	285	Sgt. E–5, U.S. Army, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii	
O'Malley, Donald E., APO Seattle, WA 98733.	1	BA LAW ENF	May 4, 1981	BC	380	U.S. Army Sgt, 526 M.P. Detachment Ft. Greely, Alaska Applic April 11, 1911.	3
Snider, Ronald F., Fort Yukon AFS, AK 98710.	1	BSBA	May 27, 1981	VISA	380	RCALOMS Elendorf AFB, Alaska, Station Manager, Fort Yukon AFS	8C
Spano, Vincent J., S. Acworth, NH 03607	7	BS&MS AVI	June 6, 1979, Nov. 15, 1981.	VISA	743.75	Application Dated: 10/19/81, Commanding Officer for Project Compass Dart (does not state location).	8C
Stanley, Richard L., Box 527, (MP) APO, NY 09176.	5	AS SEC MGT	Sept. 21, 1981	HHD USMCA–HLM BC.	285	Military Police Physical Security, Office of Provost Marshall, Heilbronn, Germany.	5N
Toney, Jr., Frank, Chicago, IL 60644	6	BSME	June 1978	MO	380	Engineer VA Hospital Chicago, Ill. Applic 10–7–81	3B
Waxer, Jerry A., Jacksonville, FL 32211	7	BSBA	Nov. 1981	MO	380	Dept. of Defense Security, Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Fla., Law Enforcement Officer.	5N
Waish, Joseph P., APO, SE 98733	4	BA LAW ENF	Aug. 19, 1981	MO	285	Sgt. E–6, 526 M.P. Detachment Ft. Greely, Alaska	25
Burris, Leo F., Austin, TX 78753	3	B/ENV HEAL	Mar. 15, 1982		380	Chief of Instrumentation and Calibration for Bureau of Federal Control, Texas Dept. of Health, Application dated: 2–22–82.	5B
Garrett, Paul R., San Francisco, CA 94129	4	BA/LW ENF	Apr. 19, 1982		405	U.S. Army, 6th U.S. Army Board, Presidio, San Francisco, CA	18C
Hemmerle, Harry J., Philadelphia, PA 19111.	4	BSIE	Apr. 15, 1982		380	Application Dated: 4/16/82, U.S. Postal Service Eastern Regional Headquarters, Real Estate and Bldg. Dept. Philadelphia, PA. Facility Engineer.	8C
McMillion, Gerald L., Ft. Greely, AK 98733....	4	BSBA	April 1982		380	SP4 E–4, CRTC Supply Branch, Ft. Greely, Alaska	18C
McBride, Nancy E., Delta Junction, AK 99737.	3	BS/ED	Jan. 8, 1982		405	Application Dated: 3/5/82 Educational Aide, Dept. of Army, Army Education Center, Fort Greely, Alaska.	18C
Partridge, Jacquelin, Washington, DC 20002.	5	BSBA	May 5, 1982		380	Office of Chief of Engineers, Civil Works Program Div., Washington, DC 20314 Staff Assistant, U.S. Army.	18C
Phillips, Charles E., Sunnymead, CA 92388	5	BA/ADM JUS	May 15, 1982		380	Application Dated: 5/17/82, Norton AFB, CA, Industrial Security Specialist GS–12.	18C
Powell, Brenda S., APO, Stanley, WA 98733.	5	AS/ADM MGMT	May 1982		310	Budget clerk typist, GS–4, ADPCA, Resource Management Division, Fort Greely, Alaska.	18C
Powell, Herman L., PO Seattle, WA 98733....	3	BS/G STU	Mar. 12, 1982		405	NCOIC of outside plant, Fort Greely, Alaska	18C
Redd, Vivian C., Arlington, VA 22202	2	MA/SOC	Feb. 1, 1982		485	U.S. Patents and Trademark Office, 2021 Jeff. Davis Hwy., Arlington VA. File Integrity Technician, GS–7 also, State of Virginia advisor.	18C
Seltzer Jr., Bruce D., Winchester, VA 22601.	4	BS/CIV ENG	Aug. 15, 1982		575	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Box 57 Attended UNC 1966–1967, Middle East Division, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, GS–11.	5Q

Sieminanrawski, George P., Marnaja, FL 33032.	2	BSBA	June 1982	755 VG	U.S. Air Force, Foreman of Protective Coating Shop, Hamestead AFB, Dade Co., Florida.	18C
Wolfe, Robert P., Terra Alta, WV 26764	5	AS/MTLCONTR	May 15, 1982	285	E-5, Dept. of Army Headquarters, 7th Infantry Div. and Fort Ord, Fort Ord, CA 93941. Note: Letter apologizing for transcript with incorrect school heading to: R.P. Wolfe, from: L. B. Stoner, records manager, AWU.	5B
Marshall, Lyman E., Rye, NH 03870	1 2 4 8	BA/MA/DOC CE	June 1982, August 1982.	2,420	DOB 4/6/27, Civil Superintendent Westinghouse Nuclear Int'l, 630 Megawatt Unit 1 Nuclear Power Plant, Napot Point, Moronig, Bataan, Philippines.	5M
Martinez, Isador R., San Francisco, CA 94131.	1	BA/MGMT	May 1982	575	U.S. Postal Service, San Francisco, CA 94101 (Window Clerk) Also has sent in $1,582.00 for Masters and Doctorate.	8R
McHenry III, John J., Oklahoma City, OK 73119.	3	BSBA	July 15, 1982	575	Unit Administrator, Oklahoma Army National Guard, HQ 700th 200 NE 23rd Street, Oklahoma City, OK 73103.	5E
Nicklen, Gerald David, APO, NY 09055	4 8	PHD/CRIM JUST	Aug. 15, 1982	1,050	DOB 7-10-48, Requested degree to be dated 5/81. Army Community Service/Personnel Service Director, NATO/SHAPE Support Group (US) SHAPE, Belgium.	5M
Osbourne Jr., Harry C., Goose Creek, SC 29445.	1	BSME	May 1982	575	Chief of Standardization U.S. Air Force (possibly Charleston AFB, S.C)	18C
Richards, Charles Winston, Palm Bay, FL 32905.	2	BSEE	June 15, 1982	575	10-30-29. Operations Engineer, United Space Booster Inc., Kennedy Space Center, FLA.	5M
Robinson, Bobby L., St. Albans, WV 25117	2	BA/LIB SCI	June 15, 1982	680 VG	Ass't Supreme Court Law Librarian and Deputy Marshal, Supreme Court of Appeals, Capitol Bldg., Charleston, W. VA.	18C
Timberman, Louis G., St. Louis, MO 63132	4	BA/SEC ED	August 1982	575	Army Recruiter, St. Louis, Missouri	5F
Tuchscherer, Richard, Martinez, GA 30907	1	BS/BUS/MGMT	May 1982	575	Sergeant, First-Class, U.S. Army; and Chief Instructor, Ft. Gordon Platoon Sergeants Course.	18
Willis, Nathan L., Woodbridge, VA 22192	4	BSBA	Aug. 15, 1962	575	U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.	5Q
Woodall II, Alphonso C., Fayetteville, NC 28304.	4	BA/AVIA MGMT	Aug. 19, 1982	575	Aviation Coordinator for all Special Forces Units, Ft. Bragg, N.C.	5Q
Alexander, Douglas, Cartersville, GA 30120	4	BA/PHYS ED	Aug. 15, 1982	575	DOB 4-2-56. Spec. 5 U.S. Army Cartersville, Ga	5M
Alexander, George Terry, Augusta, GA 30906.	4	B/GEN ED	Aug. 15, 1982	575	DOB 11-28-38. Test Administrator U.S. Army Education Center, Fort Gordon, GA.	5M
Bousfield, Charles J., Merritt Island, FL 32952.	3	BSME	July 15, 1982	575	Section Chief, Post Launch Operations, United Space Boosters, Inc. Kennedy Space Center, FLA, DOB 3-24-31.	5M
Bratter, Alan N., Yonkers, NY 10710	4 8	PHD/ENVIR SCI	Aug. 15, 1982	1,050	Teacher, Lincoln HS, Yonkers, N.Y., and U.S. Army Reserves	5P
Burge, Jr., James M., Lawton, OK 73505	4	BS/BUS Mgmt	Aug. 15, 1982	575	Sr. Drill Instructor, U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.	5P
Dailey, Roosevelt, Ceiba, PR 00635	4	BSEE	Aug. 15, 1982	610	Repair Officer, U.S. Naval Station, Puerto Rico	5P
Eggleston, Orland H., Tampa, FL 33609	4	BSBA	Aug. 15, 1982	575	Senior Staff Rep. to Commander of MacDill AFB, Florida. Notes (from Eggleston) please expedite degree, competing for postion.	5Q

Name		Degree received	Date received	Method of payment	Amount received	Employment and remarks	Box used
Hull, Frederick B., Alexandria, VA 22308	1, 8	PHD/HIST	May 15, 1982		980 VG	Chief, Staff Management Div. Office, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.	18C
Johnson, Daisy M., CBC Port Hheneme, CA 93043	3	B/HOT MOT Mgmt	July 15, 1982		575	DOB 3–10–55, Petty Officer 3rd Class, U.S. Navy CBC Port Hheneme, Calif. Barracks 1182 Code 33 93045.	5M
Lochard, C. Keith, APO, San Francisco, CA 96224.	2	BS/ENG-TECH	June 15, 1982		575	DOB 12/3/25, U.S. Dept. of Defense, General Foreman, Camp Casey, Korea.	5M
Gilreath, Larry J., Picayune, MS 39466	2 7	BSoA	Dec. 1, 1981		750	U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office, NSTL Station, Bay St. Louis, Mo. Supervisory Personnel Management Specialist.	50
Judd, John C., Fayetteville, NC 28304	1 7	B/Aviation Tech.	Oct. 12, 1981		650	Pilot—U.S. Army	50
Kelly, John W., Ft. Stewart, GA 31314	2 6	BSBA			430	SSA–U.S. Army, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry Ft. Stewart, Georgia. No transcript, no SSAN. Date of application: Aug. 31, 1981.	50
Morgan, Frank, Killeen, TX 76514	2 4	BSBA MBA	June 15, 1979, June 2, 1981.		1,550	Date of Application: June 13, 1981. Appl. Heading—National College of Arts in Sciences, Central Texas College—Asst. Exec. Dean for Military Program.	50
Morgan, Lee R., Jacksonville, FL 32216	1 7	BSET	Nov. 15, 1981		750	U.S. Army A.V.C. Pentagon Radio/TV Systems Specialist	50
Morris, Fred L., Arlington, VA 22204	4 7	MA Soc. Science	Sept. 21 1981		385	GS–2005–O ordering Officer-Supply Clerk, Arlington Hall Station. U.S. Military Intelligence Command.	50
Peiice Sammy D, Oklahoma City, OK 73132.	2 7	B Aviation			290	DOT, FAA Aeronautical Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, GS–13 Air Traffic Control Specialist, Date of Application: Sept. 22, 1981.	50
Teasdale, William E., Pearland, TX 77581	5 7	PHD/EE/Aerospace			590	No transcript Aero Space Technologist—NASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas 77058.	50
Bailey, Billy R., Delta Junction, AK 99737	8	M Pub. Adm	Jan. 9, 1982	R	510	Dept. of Army—Civilian Personnel Office, Headquarters, 172nd Infantry Brigade, Fort Oraly, Alaska.	18C
Barber, Joseph R., Hadden Heights, NJ 08035.	5	BSBA	Sept. 21, 1981	BC	380	U.S. Postal Service, Regional Real Estate & Buildings Dept., Program Control Group.	3
Eubanks, Darrell K., Havelock, NC 28532	6	AS LIB ATS	Oct. 26, 1981	MO	285	Corporal—U.S. Marine Corps—High Power Illuminator Radar Technician—Hawk Air Defense Missile System.	5N
Figg, George R., Ft. Wayne, IN 46825	2	BSBA	June 15, 1981	MO	380	Quality Inspector—GS–9. US. Defense Logistics, DCASMA, 1616 Directors Row, Ft. Wayne, Indiana 40808.	5N
Frank, Marvin G., Ft. Greely, AK 98733	6	BSBA	Oct. 12, 1981	MO	405	Sgt. F.C. U.S. Army, Ft. Greely, Alaska. Applic. Sept. 22, 1981	
Gola, Emil P., Sierra Vista, AZ 85635	3	MS in Mgt.	May 26, 1975	BC	485	GS–11 Industrial Engineer, Ft. Huachuca, I.O.D., Sierra Vista, Ariz. Applic. dated July 7, 1981. Degree Back dated.	31
Greber, Robert O., El Paso, TX 79936	5	BSET	Sept. 21, 1981	Visa	380	Electronic Integrated Systems Repair Inspector-Foreman Quality Awareness Branch, Material Readiness Div. DIO, Ft. Bliss, Texas 79916. WS–2650–1310.	5N

Kenneady, Ronald W., West Point, NY 10996.	6	BSBA	Nov. 2, 1981	Visa	380	Information Supervisor, U.S. Army, Public Affairs Office, U.S. Military Academy.	5N
Lord, Bobby R., APO, NY 09038	3	BSCE	July 20, 1981	PC	405	Construction Representative—GS 12, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, SNEP Resident Office, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.	5N
McClanahan, John C., Lakeside, CA 92040	6	BSEE	Aug. 13, 1980	BC	380	Transcript letter in 18C GS–9. Applic. Oct. 13, 1981. Electrical Engineer Technician, Navy Public Works Center, San Diego, Calif. Application Date: May 31, 1981.	
McBride, Carlos L., Muskegon, MI 49442	5	BSBA	Sept. 21, 1981	MO	380	SSN: 368–70–4798. U.S. Army, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas . applic. Sept. 2, 1981. Inmate.	211
Shirar, Joseph H., San Francisco, CA 96651	1	BS Tran. Mgt	Feb. 22, 1976	PWC MO	405	Application dated 6/14/81 U.S. Navy Public Works Center, Box 6, FPO, San Francisco, CA 96651 Large Portfolio in 18C.	5N
Pidilla Armando, FPO Miami, FL 34082	4	BET	Aug. 3, 1981	MO	380	(PADILLA). Petty officer 3rd class USN Hunlay	3F
Poole, Jimmy W., Andalusia, AL 36420	1	PHD PSY/CON	May 25, 1981	Visa	300	USDA–SCS Civil Engineer	5N
Carr, Richard L., South Arlington, VA 22204.	2	BSBA	June 2, 1981	BC	380	Logistics Management Specialist-GS–12 Navy-NAVMAT-Arlington, VA	5N
Knox, Kenny D., Wichita Falls, TX 76308	4	B/Bus. Adm	August 1982, Aug. 15, 1982.		575	I.R.S., Taxpayer Service Division, Wichita Falls, Texas	5P
Timberman, Louis G., St. Louis, MO 63132	4	BA/Sec. Ed	August 1982		575	Army Recruiter St. Louis, Missouri	
Gilbert, Jr., Henry, APO, New York, NY 09860.	2	BSBA	June 1982, June 15, 1982	1050 VG		GS–9 Quality Assurance Specialist Det 16–Zweibrucken AB, GE APO New York 09633.	5E
Wigfall, Daniel, Mill Valley, CA 94941	3	BSBA	Aug. 3, 1981	Visa	380	Note on application "may be trouble" (copy med.) Chief Deputy U.S. Marshal Northern District of California.	5N
Davis, Johnny, Temple, TX 76501	4	BS/Law Enf.	August 1982	VG 885		Olen E. Teague, VA Med. Ctr., Police Section GS–6 Sergeant	

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